Lets Get Rational
Yale Economist Campaigns for Stock Market Prudence
In his new book Irrational Exuberance, economist Robert J.
Shiller analyzes todays soaring U.S. stock market and the factors he says could
cause its eventual downturn.
By Roland Jones, ABCNEWS.com
from TheStreet.com
April 27,2000 Most major
historical events, from wars through revolutions, do not have simple causes. And the same
rings true for the state of the current stock market. Thats the premise of a
scathing new book by Yale University economist Robert J. Shiller.
Shiller, in Irrational Exuberance borrowing the 1996 phrase
of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that rocked the stock market analyzes
todays soaring U.S. stock market and the factors that could cause its eventual
downturn.
Overconfident Investors
Rome wasnt built in a day, nor was it destroyed by one sudden
bolt of bad fortune, Shiller muses. Instead, it grew and fell because of a plurality
of factors, some large and some small, some remote and some immediate, but all conspiring
together toward the end result.
Like the fall of Rome, a number of disparate factors have driven
up the price of stocks to giddy heights over the last two decades, he writes. These
factors, as diverse as the fall of communism and the development of the Internet, have
encouraged swelling investor confidence, and could ultimately lead to a drop in the
market.
In Shillers view, an irrational exuberance has
in turn caused a speculative bubble that is highly likely to burst. Indeed,
despite the markets recent volatility, confidence in its future growth is still
absurdly strong, he suggests.
In truth, the forecast for the stock market is likely to be
rather poor, he adds: Perhaps even dangerous.
No New Era
Shiller appears to have done his homework, including his own examinations
of investor confidence. One straw poll, for instance, assesses the percentage of people
who thought that the Dow would increase in 1999 (nearly three times the percentage that
thought it would decrease). Thats far more than the two-to-one increase-to-decrease
ratio he found in 1996.
Indeed, for Shiller the present economic danger lies in the
prevailing idea that the U.S. economy is moving into a new era, making it
impervious to stumbling blocks. Bearish to a fault, Shiller aims to dispel this belief by
comparing the current market to other times of great optimism in U.S. economic history.
His focus is not on the history of economics or the intricacies
of the stock market, but other drivers: history, economics, and more contentiously,
psychology and sociology. He examines lessons learned about the current market upswing
from these disciplines in an attempt to explain how speculative bubbles come about, and
how they sustain themselves.
Much of the evidence is drawn from the emerging field of
behavioral finance, which, as the years go by, is looking less like a minor subfield of
finance and more and more like a central pillar of serious financial theory, Shiller
writes.
Cultural Factors
Shiller examines a range of cultural factors as well, most particularly
what he characterizes as Wall Streets propaganda merchants journalists,
analysts and legislators who circulate the idea that we are entering that new
era of economic prosperity he seeks to discount.
The author also presents evidence that psychological anchors and
herd behavior further inflate the speculative bubble, and takes aim at academics and
popular thinkers who put forward research to show that the market has learned
how to become efficient.
Some of this so-called research often seems no more
rigorous than reading the tea leaves, writes Shiller. Arguments that the Dow
is going to 36,000 or 40,000 or 100,000 hardly inspire trust.
Examining Exuberance
Shiller does offer some ideas for policy changes and ways investors can
minimize their exposure to the consequences of a burst bubble. For him, a re-examination
of government policies toward the stock market is of uppermost importance.
How we value the stock market now and in the future
influences major economic and social policy decisions that affect not only investors but
also society at large, even the world, writes Shiller. If we exaggerate the
present and future value of the stock market, then as a society we may invest too much in
business startups and expansions, and too little in infrastructure, education, and other
forms of human capital.
His arguments are, for the most part, solid. But at times they
seem to stand on shaky ground. For example, Shiller attributes the rise in stock market
speculation to the growth in the number of U.S. state lotteries, which have grown from 13
in 1975 to 37 in 1999.
But given that this work is more concerned with building a
portrait of how investors have become more irrationally exuberant, and not with building
an economic argument, Shiller can be forgiven for not bombarding us with numbers and
statistics.
I have therefore tried in this book to present a much
broader range of information than is usually considered in writings on the market,
writes Shiller, and I have tried to synthesize this information into a detailed
picture of the market today.
In that endeavor, he has certainly succeeded. |