

Aggregate Implications of Lumpy Adjustment

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1. Motivation

Micro adjustment is lumpy for many aggregates of interest:

- ▶ stock of durable good
- ▶ nominal prices
- ▶ capital stock
- ▶ employment

Is this relevant for aggregate dynamics?

Investment:

- ▶ **Yes** ... in **partial** equilibrium: Caballero - Engel - Haltiwanger (1995), Cooper - Haltiwanger - Power (1999), Caballero - Engel (1999)
- ▶ **No** ... in **general** equilibrium: Thomas (2002), Khan - Thomas (2003, 2008)
- ▶ **Yes** ... in **general** equilibrium: This paper




Relevant in what sense?

- ▶ Better micro foundations important per se
- ▶ Better match of the data
- ▶ Better out-of-sample forecasts
- ▶ Matters for relevant policy questions

In this paper:

- ▶ IRF with significant and systematic history dependence

In a nutshell




Outline

1. Motivation
2. Basic mechanism
3. Time series evidence
4. Model
5. Confronting the evidence
6. Aggregate dynamics
7. Conclusion

2. Basic mechanism

- ▶ Rationalize lumpy micro behavior via non-convex (fixed) adjustment costs
- ▶ Need to take heterogeneous firms seriously
- ▶ Main ingredients:
 - ▶ cross-section of mandated investment: $f(x)$
 - ▶ inaction range: $L \leq x \leq U$
- ▶ $f(x)$ and L, U depend on the state of the economy:
 - ▶ aggregate shocks
 - ▶ distribution of firm specific shocks
 - ▶ distribution of capital stock



$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{I_t}{K_t} &\cong \int_U^{+\infty} |x| f(x, t) dx - \int_{-\infty}^L |x| f(x, t) dx \\
 \text{IRF}_{0,t} &\cong \underbrace{F(L) + (1 - F(U))}_{\text{intensive margin}} + \underbrace{|L|f(L) + Uf(U)}_{\text{extensive margin}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Lumpy Investment and Time-Varying IRFs

After a sequence of above avge. shocks ('boom'):

- ▶ $f(x, t)$ with more mass close to upper trigger
- ▶ investment more responsive to a marginal shock

Similarly: investment less responsive during downturns,

Continuous time for a formal result

Beware of linear models when predicting the impact of a stimulus

To what an extent does this intuition extend to a fully specified DSGE model?

3. Time series evidence

- ▶ Let: $x_t \equiv I_t / K_{t-1}$
- ▶ Consider the following GARCH-type model:

$$x_t = \sum_{j=1}^p \phi_j x_{t-j} + \sigma_t e_t,$$

$$\sigma_t = h(x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \dots),$$

- ▶ It follows that:

$$\text{IRF}_{0,t} = \frac{\partial x_t}{\partial \varepsilon_t} = \sigma_t = h(x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \dots)$$

- ▶ Consider two specifications (also kernel estimators):

$$h(x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \dots) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \bar{x}_{t-1}^k,$$

$$h(x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \dots) = (\tilde{\alpha}_0 + \tilde{\alpha}_1 \bar{x}_{t-1}^k)^2,$$

$$\text{with } \bar{x}_t^k \equiv \frac{1}{k} \sum_{j=1}^k x_{t-j}.$$

Data:

- ▶ private, fixed, non-residential investment-to-capital-ratio
- ▶ quarterly, 1960.I–2005.IV, BLS

Series:	All	Equip	Str
p :	3	3	2
k :	8	7	3
$\alpha_1 \times 10^2$:	3.142	2.488	3.279
$t\text{-}\alpha_1$:	2.588	2.254	4.123
one sided $p\text{-}\alpha_1$:	0.005	0.013	0.000
$\pm \log(\sigma_{95}/\sigma_5)$:	0.505	0.468	0.895
$\pm \log(\sigma_{90}/\sigma_{10})$:	0.429	0.334	0.771
no. obs. est. p :	180	180	180
no. obs. est. k :	176	176	176

4. Model

- ▶ Incorporates lumpy investment (and therefore firm heterogeneity) into an otherwise standard stochastic growth model
- ▶ Producer side: interesting
- ▶ Household side: simple
- ▶ Follows closely Khan and Thomas (2008)
- ▶ Two differences:
 - ▶ sector specific productivity shocks
 - ▶ maintenance investment: necessary to continue operation (fraction χ of depreciated capital)

Production Units

- ▶ No entry or exit
- ▶ Aggregate, sectoral and idiosyncratic productivity shocks
- ▶ Unit's production function:

$$y_t = z_t \epsilon_{S,t} \epsilon_{I,t} k_t^\theta n_t^\nu.$$

with log-AR(1) shocks

- ▶ $\theta + \nu < 1$
- ▶ I.i.d. cost of adjusting capital, ξ , drawn from a $U[0, \bar{\xi}]$, measured in units of labor

Production Units: Bellman Equation

Unit's problem:

$$V^1(\epsilon_S, \epsilon_I, k, \xi; z, \mu) = \max_n \{CF + \max(V_i, \max_{k'}[-AC + V_a])\},$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} CF &= [z\epsilon_S\epsilon_I k^\theta n^\nu - \omega(z, \mu)n - i^M]p(z, \mu), \\ V_i &= \beta E[V^0(\epsilon'_S, \epsilon'_I, \psi(1 - \delta)k/\gamma; z', \mu')], \\ AC &= \xi\omega(z, \mu)p(z, \mu), \\ V_a &= -ip(z, \mu) + \beta E[V^0(\epsilon'_S, \epsilon'_I, k'; z', \mu')], \\ \mu &= \text{distribution of } (\epsilon_S, \epsilon_I, k). \end{aligned}$$

Households

- ▶ A continuum of identical households with access to a complete set of state-contingent claims
- ▶ Felicity function:

$$U(C, N^h) = \log C - AN^h$$

- ▶ The intertemporal price:

$$p(z, \mu) \equiv U_C(C, N^h) = 1/C(z, \mu).$$

- ▶ The intratemporal price:

$$\omega(z, \mu) \equiv -\frac{U_N(C, N^h)}{p(z, \mu)} = \frac{A}{p(z, \mu)}.$$

Recursive Equilibrium

A **recursive competitive equilibrium** is a set of functions

$$\omega, p, V^1, N, K', C, N^h, \Gamma$$

such that

1. *Production unit optimality*: Taking ω , p and Γ as given, demand N and K'
2. *Household optimality*: Taking ω and p as given, the household optimally chooses consumption C and labor N^h
3. *Commodity market clearing*
4. *Labor market clearing*
5. *Model consistent dynamics*: $\mu' = \Gamma(z, \mu)$.

Equilibrium Computation

- ▶ μ : infinite dimensional
- ▶ We follow Krusell and Smith:
 - ▶ approximate μ by its first moment over capital
 - ▶ approximate $\mu' = \Gamma(z, \mu)$ by a log-linear rule
- ▶ To simplify computations: $\rho_S = \rho_I$, the unit then only cares about $\epsilon \equiv \epsilon_S \epsilon_I$.

5. Confronting the evidence


Most parameters: standard values suggested by micro studies

No such values available for the adjustment cost parameter $\bar{\zeta}$ and the maintenance parameter χ

Some options:

- ▶ Maximum likelihood?
- ▶ Match certain moments
- ▶ Moments from the distribution of plant level investment?
 - ▶ how many micro units in the **model** correspond to one **observed** micro unit?
- ▶ Moments suitable to gauge the relative importance of PE and GE smoothing

Sources of Smoothing in Macroeconomics



Sources of Smoothing: Lumpy Investment Models

1. Micro frictions \equiv PE smoothing:

- ▶ it isn't only the size of adjustment costs
- ▶ **aggregation** is central
- ▶ Caplin and Spulber (1987) as an extreme example

2. Price responses \equiv GE smoothing:

- ▶ quasi labor supply
- ▶ supply of funds

Our Calibration

- ▶ There are many combinations of PE and GE smoothing that achieve the same degree of aggregate smoothing
- ▶ Use 3-digit sectoral data to calibrate the relative importance of PE and GE smoothing
 - ▶ mainly partial equilibrium effects at this level:
- ▶ Benchmark calibration:
 - ▶ Match: $\sigma_{\text{sect}}(I/K)$, $\sigma_{\text{agg}}(I/K)$, $\pm \log(\sigma_{95}/\sigma_5)$
 - ▶ Parameters: $\bar{\zeta}$, χ , σ_A
- ▶ Robustness check:
 - ▶ Match: $\sigma_{\text{sect}}(I/K)$, $\sigma_{\text{agg}}(I/K)$
 - ▶ Parameters: $\bar{\zeta}$, σ_A


Standard Choices

- ▶ Model period: quarter
- ▶ Standard choices: $\beta = 0.9942$, $\delta = 0.022$, $\rho_A = 0.95, \dots$
- ▶ $\nu = 0.64$ and $\theta = 0.18$:
 - ▶ labor share: 0.64
 - ▶ revenue-elasticity of capital: 0.50
- ▶ $\sigma_S = 0.0273$, $\rho_S = 0.8612$: standard Solow residual calculation on *annual* 3-digit manufacturing data, taking into account sector-specific trends and time-aggregation
- ▶ $\sigma_I = 0.0472 \Rightarrow$ total s.d. = 0.10
- ▶ Non-trivial choices: $\bar{\xi}$ and χ


Results: Economic Magnitude of Adjustment Costs

	Tot. adj. costs/ Agg. Output	Tot. adj. costs/ Agg. Invest.	Adj. costs/ Unit Output	Adj. costs/ Unit Wage Bill
quart.	0.35%	2.41%	9.53%	14.88%
annual	0.41%	2.84%	3.60%	5.62%


Smoothing and $\sigma(I/K)$: RBC



Smoothing and $\sigma(I/K)$: Khan and Thomas



Smoothing and $\sigma(I/K)$: This Paper



Why the Difference?

We choose to match sectoral investment volatility:

	3-dig. Agg. Ratio
<i>Data</i>	1.66
This paper:	1.66
Frictionless/Khan-Thomas (2008):	18 - 44

We choose to match IRF volatility:

	$\log(\sigma_{95}/\sigma_5)$
<i>Data</i>	0.30
This paper:	0.29
Frictionless/Khan-Thomas (2008):	0.05

6. Aggregate Investment Dynamics

- ▶ Explain why our DSGE model with lumpy adjustment generates a procyclical IRF
- ▶ Is it variations in PE- or GE-smoothing?
- ▶ Is it related to the intensive or extensive margin?
- ▶ Relation to the “basic mechanism”

Responsiveness Index

Define:


$$\mathcal{I}^+(\mu_t, \log z_t) \equiv \left[\frac{I}{K}(\mu_t, \log z_t + \sigma_A) - \frac{I}{K}(\mu_t, \log z_t) \right] / \sigma_A,$$

$$\mathcal{I}^-(\mu_t, \log z_t) \equiv \left[\frac{I}{K}(\mu_t, \log z_t - \sigma_A) - \frac{I}{K}(\mu_t, \log z_t) \right] / (-\sigma_A)$$


Responsiveness Index at time t defined as:

$$RI_t \equiv 0.5 [\mathcal{I}^+(\mu_t, \log z_t) + \mathcal{I}^-(\mu_t, \log z_t)].$$

IRF upon impact from model (1960–2005)



Robustness check – Second calibration



Why strongly procyclical?

- ▶ A decline in the strength of PE-smoothing explains the rise in the index during the boom phase
 - ▶ the responsiveness index fluctuates much less in the frictionless economy
 - ▶ frictionless economy only has GE-smoothing
 - ▶ hence: contribution of GE smoothing to fluctuations in responsiveness index of lumpy economy is small
- ▶ As the boom proceeds, the economy comes “closer” to the Caplin-Spulber limit

Mandated Investment


- ▶ We have:

$$k' = \begin{cases} k^*(\epsilon; z, \bar{k}), & \text{if } \tilde{\zeta} \leq \zeta^T(\epsilon, k; z, \bar{k}), \\ (1 - \delta + \chi\delta)k, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- ▶ We define **mandated investment** for a unit with current state (ϵ, z, \bar{k}) and current capital k as:

$$x(\epsilon; z, \bar{k}) \equiv \log k^*(\epsilon; z, \bar{k}) - \log[1 - \delta + \chi\delta]k.$$

Mandated Investment Cross-Section and Hazard




Why strongly procyclical?

During booms:


- ▶ the fraction of units with mandated investment close to zero decreases
- ▶ the fraction of units with mandated investment above 40% increases
- ▶ the fraction of units with negative mandated investment decreases
- ▶ the x-section moves into regions where the probability of adjusting is higher and steeper
 - ▶ this effect is not present in a frictionless (or Calvo) model

RI: Intensive and Extensive Margins




Fluctuations in responsiveness index driven mainly by variations in the **fraction** of units adjusting (**extensive** margin)

I/K : Intensive and Extensive Margins



Doms and Dunne (1998): it's the **fraction** of units undergoing major investment episodes

Understanding the Bust



- ▶ More capital accumulation in the lumpy economy
- ▶ Large fraction in region where units are unresponsive to shocks

7. Conclusion

- ▶ Time-series evidence suggests time-varying IRFs
- ▶ Lumpy adjustment DSGE models with mainly GE-smoothing forces cannot deliver history dependent IRFs
- ▶ Lumpy adjustment DSGE models where both PE and GE-smoothing are relevant deliver can