Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics

Microeconomic Theory Conference
REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING

April 28–29, 2000

| List of Attendees | Photographs |

FRIDAY, APRIL 28th
MORNING CHAIR: David Pearce
9:00 Continental Breakfast
9:30–10:45 Michihiro Kandori, "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: An Introduction"
10:45–11:15 Break
11:15–12:30 V. Bhaskar, "The Robustness of Repeated Game Equilibria to Incomplete Payoff Information"
12:30 Lunch
AFTERNOON Symposium on Mixed Strategies and Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
CHAIR: Stephen Morris
  Discussion of recent papers including:
V. Bhaskar, "Sequential Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring"
V. Bhaskar and Eric van Damme, "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring"
Jeff Ely and Juuso Välimäki, "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma"
Ichiro Obara, "Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring: A N-player Case"
Michele Piccione, "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring"
Tadashi Sekiguchi, "Robustness of Efficient Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring."
Tadashi Sekiguchi, "Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring" (JET 97)
2:30–3:00 Jeff Ely
3:00–4:00 Ichiro Obara
4:00–4:30 Break
4:30–5:00 Tadashi Sekiguchi
5:00–6:00 Discussion
7:00 Cocktails, Omni Hotel (155 Temple Street, 19th Floor)
7:30 Dinner, Omni Hotel (155 Temple Street, 19th Floor)

SATURDAY, APRIL 29th
MORNING CHAIR: George Mailath
9:00–9:30 Continental Breakfast
9:30–10:45 Juuso Välimäki and Dirk Bergemann, "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Information"

10:45–11:15

 Break

11:15–12:30

 Oliver Compte, "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private"

12:30

 Lunch

AFTERNOON

 CHAIR: Michihiro Kandori

2:15–3:30

 Hitoshi Matsushima, "Private Monitoring, Likelihood Ratio Conditions, and the Folk Theorem"
3:30–4:00 Break
4:00–5:15 George Mailath and Stephen Morris, "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring"
  Further Papers on this Topic:
Jeff Ely, "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring"
Ichiro Obara, "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited"
Olivier Compte, "Secret Price Cutting and Strategic Buyers: An Illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic"
Olivier Compte, "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations"

LIST OF ATTENDEES
Dilip Abreu (Princeton)
Massimiliano Amarante (Columbia)
Masaki Aoyagi (Pittsburgh)
Dirk Bergemann (Yale)
V. Bhaskar (Essex)
Olivier Compte (CERAS)
Martin Cripps (Warwick, visiting Washington at St. Louis)
Jeff Ely (Northwestern)
Drew Fudenberg (Harvard)
John Geanakoplos (Yale)
Philippe Jehiel (UCL)
Michihiro Kandori (Tokyo, visiting LSE)
Jonathan Levin (Stanford, visiting Yale)
David Levine (UCLA)		 George Mailath (Penn)
Hitoshi Matsushima (Tokyo)
Stephen Morris (Yale)
Ichiro Obara (Penn)
David Pearce (Yale)
Martin Pesendorfer (Yale)
Ben Polak (Yale)
Rafael Rob (University of Pennsylvania)
Herbert Scarf (Yale)
Tadashi Sekiguchi (Osaka, visiting Penn)
Martin Shubik (Yale)
Ennio Stacchetti (Michigan)
Juuso Välimäki (Southampton)
Eric van Damme (Tilburg University)