|
Cowles Foundation for
Research in Economics
Microeconomic Theory Conference
REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING
April 28–29, 2000
| List of Attendees | Photographs | |
| FRIDAY |
Morning |
CHAIR: David Pearce |
|
9:00–9:30 |
Continental Breakfast |
|
9:30–10:45 |
Michihiro Kandori, "Repeated Games
with Private Monitoring: An Introduction" |
|
10:45–11:15 |
Break |
|
11:15–12:30 |
V. Bhaskar, "The Robustness of Repeated Game Equilibria to Incomplete Payoff
Information" |
|
12:00 |
Lunch |
|
Afternoon |
Symposium on Mixed Strategies and Repeated
Games with Private Monitoring — CHAIR: Stephen Morris |
|
|
Discussion of recent papers including:
» V. Bhaskar, "Sequential
Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring"
» V. Bhaskar and Eric van Damme, "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring"
» Jeff Ely and Juuso Välimäki, "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma"
» Ichiro Obara, "Repeated
Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring: A N-player Case"
» Michele Piccione, "The
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring"
» Tadashi Sekiguchi, "Robustness of Efficient Equilibria in Repeated
Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring"
» Tadashi Sekiguchi, "Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
with Private Monitoring" (JET 97) |
|
2:30–3:00 |
Jeff Ely |
|
3:00–4:00 |
Ichiro Obara |
|
4:00–4:30 |
Break |
|
4:30–5:00 |
Tadashi Sekiguchi |
|
5:00–6:00 |
Discussion |
|
7:00 |
Cocktails, Omni Hotel (155 Temple Street,
19th Floor) |
|
7:30 |
Dinner, Omni Hotel (155 Temple Street, 19th
Floor) |
| SATURDAY |
Morning |
CHAIR: George Mailath |
|
9:00–9:30 |
Continental Breakfast |
|
9:30–10:45 |
Juuso Välimäki and Dirk Bergemann, "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed
Information" |
|
10:45–11:15 |
Break |
|
11:15–12:30 |
Oliver Compte, "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private" |
|
12:30 |
Lunch |
|
Afternoon |
CHAIR: Michihiro Kandori |
|
2:15–3:30 |
Hitoshi Matsushima, "Private Monitoring, Likelihood Ratio Conditions, and
the Folk Theorem" |
|
3:30–4:00 |
Break |
|
4:00–5:15 |
George Mailath and Stephen Morris, "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring" |
|
|
Further Papers on this Topic:
» Jeff Ely, "Correlated Equilibrium
and Private Monitoring"
» Ichiro Obara, "Private Strategy
and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited"
» Olivier Compte, "Secret Price
Cutting and Strategic Buyers: An Illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic"
» Olivier Compte, "On Sustaining
Cooperation without Public Observations" |
LIST OF Attendees
|
Dilip Abreu (Princeton)
Massimiliano Amarante (Columbia)
Masaki Aoyagi (Pittsburgh)
Dirk Bergemann (Yale)
V. Bhaskar (Essex)
Olivier Compte (CERAS)
Martin Cripps (Warwick, visiting Washington at St. Louis)
Jeff Ely (Northwestern)
Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) |
John Geanakoplos (Yale)
Philippe Jehiel (UCL)
Michihiro Kandori (Tokyo, visiting LSE)
Jonathan Levin (Stanford, visiting Yale)
David Levine (UCLA)
George Mailath (Penn)
Hitoshi Matsushima (Tokyo)
Stephen Morris (Yale)
Ichiro Obara (Penn) |
David Pearce (Yale)
Martin Pesendorfer (Yale)
Ben Polak (Yale)
Rafael Rob (University of Pennsylvania)
Herbert Scarf (Yale)
Tadashi Sekiguchi (Osaka, visiting Penn)
Martin Shubik (Yale)
Ennio Stacchetti (Michigan)
Juuso Välimäki (Southampton)
Eric van Damme (Tilburg University) |
|