COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
AT YALE UNIVERSITY

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1757R

DYNAMIC AUCTIONS: A SURVEY

Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said

March 2010
Revised: May 13, 2010

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

Keywords: Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility

JEL Classification: C73, D43, D44, D82, D83