COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
AT YALE UNIVERSITY

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1592

GAMES OF CONNECTIVITY

Pradeep Dubey
Center for Game Theory in Economics, Stony Brook University (USA) and
Cowles Foundation, Yale University (USA)

Rahul Garg
IBM India Research Lab, New Delhi (India)

We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a wide variety of seemingly disparate models.

Keywords: Information lattice, Multicast/unicast transmission, Cooperative games, Shapley value, Convex/supermodular games

JEL Classification: C71, D82, L96